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Abstract

This study is an exploratory historical analysis of the factors that have influenced
the evolution of military Information Assurance (IA) programs from World War I to the
present. Although the term IA has recently been widely used throughout the Information
Resource Management field (IRM), evidence indicates that information and information
systems protection mechanisms were used during every U.S. Military conflict. This
research proposes to increase the body of knowledge within the information systems
management field by exploring the areas related to Information Assurance (IA) and the
ultimate goal of U. S. Defensive Information Warfare.
I found that significant events related to the protection of information and
information systems security throughout each U.S. Military conflict led to the
implementation of IA concepts. The evaluation of these events provides information that
reveals a common approach to IA throughout history and supports the identification of
key concepts that have influenced this evolutionary process and shaped the role of IA in
current military operations, with indicators of how it may be used in the future.
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AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED THE
EVOLUTION OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE FROM
WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM TO THE PRESENT

I. Introduction

Overview
World War I (WWI) introduced numerous technological advancements that
revolutionized the nature of twentieth century warfare (AMH, 1989). Such
advancements also paved the way for many of the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)
that have taken place since then. In his book, Lifting the Fog of War, Admiral Bill
Owens states that “the technological base of the current RMA remains the central
component of a transformed twenty-first century American fighting force.” He also
states that “this RMA will be the best hope for the United States to keep its armed forces
superior to any other nation’s (Owens, 2000).” The technological strides made from
WWI forward set the stage for further advancements of military capabilities and expertise
throughout the history of U.S. military operations. According to Andrew Krepinevich,
RMA is described as a dynamic process:
“An RMA occurs when the application of new technologies into a
significant number of systems combines with innovative operational
concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters
the character and conduct of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic
increase-often an order of magnitude or greater-in the combat potential
and military effectiveness of armed forces" (Krepinevich, 1994: 30).

1

Such innovative approaches have continued to change the way military operations are
conducted. This trend will likely continue well into the future.
A wide array of computer and network hardware and software that can be
adaptable for military use will empower the U.S. Military to maintain combat superiority
over adversaries well into the twenty-first century (Owens, 2000). This goal cannot be
achieved without the highest levels of Information Assurance (IA), which provides the
basic building blocks for the protection and defense of information and information
systems. Joint Publication 3-13, a document developed by the Department of Defense
(DOD), defines IA as the protection and defense of systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, identification, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (JP 3-13, 1998). These
fundamental terms form the building blocks for successful IA. There are several different
definitions of these five terms, however, Maconachy (2001), McKnight (2002), and
Cummings (2002) assembled definitions that reveal key aspects of IA as characterized by
this research effort.
•

Authentication is verification of the originator. A security service
designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or
originator. It ensures that the information originated from a specific
known source. It verifies the identity of the user, device, or other
entity in a computer system, often as a prerequisite to allowing access
to resources in a system. It ensures that you have the right to see the
information, and that you are who you say you are.

•

Availability is the assured access to data by authorized users. It is the
state where information is in the place needed by the user, at the time
the user needs it, and in the form needed by the user. One key is
timely delivery of information and that the information presented in a
form that is wanted and can be understood. Can be related to security
services including back-up power, spare data channels, off site
capabilities, and continuous signals.
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•

Confidentiality is the protection from unauthorized disclosure. It is the
concept of holding sensitive data in confidence, limiting it to an
appropriate set of individuals or organizations. Referred to as
information security and addresses the issues of clearances and a need
to know.

•

Integrity is the protection from unauthorized change. It involves
information or communications that are sound, unimpaired, and in
perfect condition. Looks at the overall architecture of the system
including how it is designed, implemented, and maintained.

•

Non Repudiation is the undeniable proof of participation in a
communication. It is a service that provides proof of the integrity and
origin of data in an unforgettable relationship, which can be verified
by any third party at any time. It involves a communication that is
genuine and cannot be refuted. Key aspects are proof of origin,
submission, and delivery.

The terms identified above can be further characterized as security concepts relating to
the point to point communications or internet transmissions; confidentiality, integrity, and
availability and security concepts relating to people; authentication, authorization, and
non-repudiation. These terms also represent a desired end state accomplished by the
overall organizational goal.
This thesis will explore the areas related to IA and the ultimate goal of Defensive
Information Warfare throughout the history of the U. S. Military from WWI through
Vietnam to the present. This research will be qualitative and rely on historical
perspectives of various documentation and personal accounts relating to IA and building
theory on the evolution of IA and the ultimate goal of information superiority (IS).
Joint Vision 2020, developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines IS as, “the
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (JV2020, 2000).” JV2020
also states that Information Superiority is a key enabler of the transformation of military
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operational capability during peace and conflict (JV2020, 2000). It has been widely
accepted that the one who controls the flow of information to the battlefield will emerge
the victor. According to a recent research effort, this phenomenon will continue to
expand the capabilities of the warfighter:
“The proliferation of information technologies will continue to shape the
behavior of military operations…unlike early military research and
development where technologies were created and advanced internally,
information and computing technology is largely commercialized and
therefore available to all” (Knode, 2003).
The most recent capabilities of IS were seen first hand during Operation Iraqi Freedom
and ongoing operations in the gulf region. Most people observed this phenomenon take
shape by tuning into CNN, Fox News, or MSNBC, where they watched embedded
journalists with military units, and daily updates from various military leaders. Only
recently have such advances in technology been so readily available. In the past, various
data was just as important, however, it took much longer to transform such data into
usable information. We are now seeing first hand how information technologies have
transformed military operations. The protection of these various advancements in
information technologies, which assists in the formulation of communications strategies,
is equally important.
The U. S. Military is an agile force capable of sustaining the technological and
operational capability needed to win America’s battles. The success of this technological
capability will depend on IA initiatives and will ultimately lead to IS over adversaries.
Normal military operations have demonstrated the constant need for IA. This need is
infinitely greater once crisis or conflict become apparent. IA forms the foundation of
defensive information warfare, which protects information resources from attack

4

(Denning, 1999: 12). The foundation of effective information operations (IO) is also
imbedded in IA strategies. IA focuses on the defensive or protective aspect of
information systems during Information Operations (IO). Joint Publication (JP 3-13,
1998) defines IO as actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems from attack
Figure 1 shows that IA is the only element of information operations represented across
the entire spectrum from peace, to crises, to conflict, and back to peace again.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS TIME

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
INFORMATION
ASSURANCE
INFORMATION
WARFARE
SPECIAL INFORMATION
OPERATIONS

Peace

Crises

Conflict

Peace

Intelligence
Figure 1: Relationships across time (JP 3-13, 1998: I-4)
To achieve total protection of information and information systems from attack, IA
programs must meet the commander’s needs across the entire spectrum of events.
Additionally, IA must coexist with information warfare and special information
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operations during the crises and conflict spectrum. This relationship must be dynamic
and complementary to ensure the highest degree of dominance. Although this strategy
has only recently been identified as such, military operations in the past have also relied
on a similar operational activities that ensure appropriate levels of IO
Some aspects of IO will only take place during crises and conflict and others will
take place at various stages throughout the entire spectrum. IA must occur throughout
because the basic defensive measures will often help prevent crisis and conflict.
Although this format is only recently been incorporated into military doctrine, current
military leaders indicate that IO in relation to IA has always been structured similarly (JP
3-13, 1998: II-8).

Problem Statement
Although the term IA has only recently been widely used throughout the
Information Resource Management field (IRM), there is a strong indication that
information and information system protection mechanisms were used during every U.S.
Military conflict from WWI forward and that the ultimate goal of IS has lead to a certain
level of IA throughout. To understand its importance, it may be valuable to trace IA
related concepts back through various military conflicts. The evaluation of these
conflicts can be used to provide key characteristics of IA throughout that time. This
research effort will explore how past military conflicts have also relied on IA during
defensive information warfare as far back as WWI even though such efforts were not
referred to as IA. The goal will be the identification of concepts that have influenced this
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evolutionary process and shaped the role of IA in current and future military
environments.

Research Question
IA is expected to be an integral element in the process that leads to IS in future
military operations. Since this goal of achieving IS will continue to be paramount, it may
be useful to explore the role of concepts related to the protection of information and
information systems in past and current military operations and how such concepts will
influence the future. What are the factors that have influenced the evolution of IA from
WWI through Vietnam to the present?

Investigative Questions
1. Prior to the establishment of IA programs, what key programs
were established to protect information and information systems in
the U.S. Military from WWI through Vietnam to the present?
2. What is an appropriate evolutionary model of IA given military
operations from WWI through Vietnam to the present?
3. What lessons can we learn from the implementation of IA
programs and the evolutionary model of IA?
Methodology
The research methodology chosen for this thesis effort will center on historical
research techniques. According to Nel (1983), historical research is:
“The systematic process of collecting and objectively evaluating data
related to past occurrences to arrive at conclusions about the causes,
effects, or trends of past events that may be helpful in explaining the
present or anticipating events.”
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Being able to interpret perspectives from various documents and personal accounts gives
benefit to historical research. Since it deals with the meaning of events, the heart of the
historical method is not only the accumulation of facts, but also the interpretation of the
facts (Leedy, 2001). The focus of this historical research will be to trace the evolution of
information assurance initiatives. The intent will be to identify programs and initiatives
developed to assist with the protection and defense of information and information
systems during military operations. The purpose will be to identify specific aspects still
present or those that have changed with technology and time.
I will develop of an overall evolutionary model based on factors that relate to
information assurance, information operations, information warfare, and current and past
military operations. Additionally, I will parallel related factors with information that
supports the validity or lack thereof by other historical documentation on this subject.

Scope and Limitations
The overall focus of this research effort will center on the historical perspective of
information assurance during military operations and the critical time between conflicts
and the identification of potential doctrinal changes. This research effort will focus on
the U.S. Military during various operations since WWI through Vietnam related to IA in
its current form. Limiting this effort to this period and concepts will narrow the overall
analytical scope and provide a snapshot into a specific time when electronic and
communication advancements began to enhance the technological competence of the
warfighter. This research will focus on documentation that explores Command, Control,
Communications, computers and Intelligence (C4I); military leadership; decision-making
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processes; and defensive measures that concentrate on the protection of information and
information system resources.

Significance
Advancements in technology and innovation continue to produce constant change
in military environments. These advancements also provide a clear understanding of
concepts that aid certain evolutional aspects over time. This research is intended to assist
in the understanding of the evolving role of IA in the U.S. Military.

Thesis Overview
Chapter One included a brief overview of the background information, a
description of the overall methodology, presentation of the research questions, and the
intended significance of this research effort. Chapter Two reviews the research
methodology and overall theory and provides justification for using various historical
approaches and IA models. Chapter Three explores current literature on the historical
perspectives of warfare and the protection of information and summarizes background
information pertinent to Information Operations (IO) strategies related to aspects of
Defensive Counter Information (DCI) under the IA domain. Chapter Four discusses the
findings from an analysis of the information presented in Chapter Three including
research questions one and two. Finally, Chapter Five provides a discussion of research
question three, limitations, suggestions for future research, and conclusions.
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II. Methodology

Introduction
Chapter One provided background information, described the research problem,
and briefly discussed the research scope and methodology. This chapter will describe the
methodology used to investigate the research problem and theory proposed in chapter
one. This chapter will also provide justification for using the historical research method
for Management Information Systems (MIS), the National Security Agency’s
Information Assurance Model (IAM), and the Information Assurance Model presented by
McCumber and Maconachy et al.

Research Methodology
A historical research methodology was chosen for this thesis effort. Historical
research is defined as a systematic process designed to collect and objectively evaluate
data related to past occurrences to arrive at conclusions that may be helpful in explaining
the present (Nel, 1983). Historical research also uses inductive reasoning approaches to
build theories that ultimately draw conclusions about entire classes of events. Leedy et al
(2001) describes historical research as separate and individual facts observed by the
researcher and used to assist with the establishment of a specific theory. The goal of this
research effort is to build theory by using a specific framework and interpreting the
information and facts presented. Since historical research involves independent
investigation, it is important to ensure that common problems do not plaque this effort.
Borg et al (2002) discusses two common problems with historical research. First, it is
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difficult to maintain rigor or avoid external criticism of the use of non-authentic sources.
Secondly, maintaining objectivity or avoiding the biases and distortions that define
internal criticism can lead to additional problems. Reflecting on the purposes of history
as a mirror, the French philosopher Michel Foucalt commented:
“The final trait of effective history is it’s affirmation of knowledge as
perspective. Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements of their
work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and space, their
preferences in a controversy – the unavoidable obstacles of their passion.”
In Paul Godfrey’s (1996) assessment of Mr. Foucalt’s assessment he states:
“Foucalt’s evaluation of history demonstrates that any treatise that goes
beyond the mere recitation of chronological events, speaks more about the
researcher’s own intellectual, moral, and emotional location than about a
“correct” evaluation of historical events. The task must focus on revealing
the mirror through which history is viewed as well as history itself.”
In other words, it is important to present to others historical facts that are grounded by
credible sources and thorough interpretation of the pertinent details of the specific topics
covered.
To alleviate the risk associated with the problems identified above, the specific
methodological approach must demonstrate objectivity and accuracy. To ensure these
concepts, several libraries were searched for information dealing with IA during past
military conflicts. Initially, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) along with
Wright State University and the University of Dayton, all of which are located in Dayton,
Ohio, were used as primary research facilities. Follow on research conducted at Marine
Corps University (MCU), Quantico, Virginia provided an extensive amount of resources
related to communications and intelligence during past military conflicts. MCU was also
a first rate location and facility for any material related to the history of warfare.
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Approach
A historical research approach in MIS developed by academics working on a
research project at Harvard University’s School of Business provides structure and
purpose for this current effort. McKenny et al (1997) developed a seven-step
methodology for conducting historical research in MIS. This seven-step process,
modified to meet the current requirements, provides a specific structure and an overall
outline to the period being researched and the presentation of information discovered:
•

Begin with focusing questions.

•

Specify the domain.

•

Tell the story

•

Write the transcript

•

Gather the evidence

•

Critique the evidence

•

Determine patterns.

This seven-step process helps to establish the specific format needed to view pertinent
information used to analyze present circumstances throughout the MIS field. The steps
identified will also lead the researcher and research towards the development of a robust
MIS historical research theory.
Current IA theory identified in chapter one discusses the five building blocks for
any successful IA program; availability, integrity, identification, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation (JP 3-13, 1998). As the current IA theory focuses on these building blocks, it
is important to demonstrate where this information fits into the historical domain.
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Theories developed by McKenny et al (1997) support these building blocks by
demonstrating how history and historical research provides a backdrop from which to
determine what is novel in any current situation and which factors serve to distinguish
the present from developments of the past. Stanford (1986) describes the structure of
historical research as follows:

Figure 2: Structure of History (Stanford, 1986)
Bannister (2002) describes the Stanford model as significant in the interpretive processes
encountered from historical research, over a long period of time, when the researcher
may not have been present.
In a study of Bank of America and it’s banking operations achievements, the
researchers developed the concept of the Dominant Design. A dominant design is a
design that has the potential to yield superior results for any organization. It is generally
a result of a radical – as opposed to an evolutionary – innovation in an industry. Even
though the concept of the dominant design is a result of a radical and not an evolutionary
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innovation, there is indication throughout the history of U.S. wartime operations that
dominant design often took place. As events happened, various processes turned into
evolutionary events over time and ultimately shaped the outcome of current events.
McKenny et al (1997) also proposed a framework for information systems research
during the Bank of America study. This framework provides a distinct concept that
further demonstrates the realization of dominant design within the organization. This
concept is the cascade approach. The cascade approach is a conceptual framework for
describing the development or emergence of an information system. The following key
areas make up cascade process approach:
•

Crisis.

•

Search for a technical solution.

•

Initial technical solution found.

•

Adjustments throughout the organization.

•

Assets formed, which resolves crisis.

•

Dominant Design.

The basis for this framework is developed on the notion that there is a crisis within an
organization, which is resolved by the use of information technology or system
(Bannister, 2002). The crisis within the scope of this research is war or conflict of the
U.S. military since WWI. Within the realm of the protection of key communications,
major crisis, followed by concepts identified in the cascade approach, shaped the tactical
nature of how various communications activities developed and ultimately changed with
advancements in technology. Bannister (2002) also believes that successful completion
of the cascade process relies on the three roles of the leader, maestro, and super-tech to
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drive the organization towards the overall goal of the dominant design. Evidence
suggests that events related to MIS and IA during past military conflicts have followed
similar paths towards the creation of new techniques and procedures.
The National Security Agency’s (NSA) Information Security Assessment Model
(IAM) identifies 18 baseline categories that should be included as components of the
Information Assurance posture of any organization (Hurd, 2001):
Table 1: NAS IAM 18 Baseline Categories (Hurd, 2001)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

IA Documentation
IA Roles and Responsibilities
Identification & Authentication
Account Management
Session controls
External Connectivity
Telecommunications
Auditing
Virus Protection
Contingency Planning
Maintenance
Configuration Management
Back-Ups
Labeling
Media Sanitization/Disposal
Physical Environment
Personnel Security
Training and Awareness

These categories are generally accepted when developing and maintaining systems under
the information technology (IT) realm (Swanson, 1996). Even though there are several
organizations that provide justification of important categories, the NSA IAM was
developed specifically for government and commercial organizations and is often
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referred to as the accepted standard for IA related system certifications to enhance the
protection of information and the establishment of functional IA programs (Hurd, 2001;
256).
A limited number of models dedicated to the understanding of threats to
automated information systems are currently available. The McCumber (1998) model is
used to appropriately organize the 18 baseline categories for analysis and to address the
possible threats to automated systems. This comprehensive model addresses threats and
functions as an assessment and evaluation tool. McCumber argues that it is a key concept
because it is independent of technology and is not constrained by organizational
differences and thus can be used for systems development. The three dimensions focus
on information states, critical information characteristics, and security countermeasures.
Maconachy et al (2001) expanded the McCumber model to include the theory that we are
now in an information intensive environment, which broadens the scope and the overall
understanding of information and systems protection. The strength of the
multidisciplinary and multidimensional elements of the McCumber model is in its ability
to produce or maintain a robust IA program. Figure 2.3 shows this model and
demonstrates an integrated approach that accounts for three of the four dimensions of IA,
information states, security services, and security countermeasures.
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Figure 3: Information Assurance Model (Maconachy et al, 2001)

Additionally, Maconachy et al created a fourth dimension, time. The time dimension of
the integrated model demonstrates the introduction of new technology over time requires
modifications to other dimensions of the integrated model in order to restore a system to
a secure state of operation. This dimension is related to the notion that certain aspects of
the McCumber model has changed with innovation and is essential to the theory that IA
throughout military operations in warfare has evolved from earlier concepts. Essential
elemental changes over time were fundamental to the adoption of new technology or
doctrinal enhancements that were evident during military conflicts. Such changes to the
system over time were key aspects of restoring a secure state.
Using a current framework such as the Maconachy et al (2001) model to evaluate
past occurrences will provide evidence about whether the concept currently known as IA
is valid for earlier U.S. Military conflicts. A modified list of the baseline categories are
grouped in Table 1 below using the Maconachy (2001) model. This grouping will form
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the foundation for the evolutionary model that will be developed further in this research
effort.
Table 2: IA Model - NSA IAM Mapping
IA Model
Dimensions

NSA IAM Baseline
Categories

Information States
Transmission
Storage
Processing

External Connectivity
Back-Ups
Disposal
Auditing
Session Controls

Security Counter Measures
Technology

Maintenance
Telecommunications
Virus Protection

Policies and Practices

Account Management
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
IA Documentation
IA Roles & Responsibilities
Media Sanitization

People

Awareness
Personnel Security
Physical Security
Training

Each category has specific questions or pertinent information that should be included
when conducting an IA assessment and will demonstrate the applicability of earlier
indicators relating to information and information systems protection during the various
military conflicts since WWI. Accordingly, significant principles collected and
organized into two of the four dimensions of the IA Model will be depicted here. The
information states and security countermeasures dimensions will form core data elements
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and demonstrate the applicability of earlier concepts relating to the security of
information WWI through Vietnam with the present structure of IA.

Justification for Historical Research Method
Mason (1997) identifies four products that can result from a MIS historical
research focus:
•

An account of significant fragment of the past describing events of
importance to the MIS community. The account in and of itself is
informative, but also serves as contextual material for
understanding other events.

•

The resulting historical account may be used subsequently as a
“datum” in a broad process of inductive reasoning.

•

Historical research may serve as the source of new research
hypotheses.

•

Historical research results in a better understanding of the present
with indicators that will assist in meeting related future
requirements.

Current technological advancements throughout the IA field have stemmed from
significant events of the past. Research that demonstrates how IA has evolved into its
current structure will fit into any category identified above. The products of historical
research are abundant throughout the IS community even though Bannister (2002)
believes there remains a distinct shortage of good MIS or IS historical studies of
information systems in organizations and how these systems influence and shape
organizations over time. The theory is that the study of IS using historical perspectives is
still in its infancy. Over the past 30 years, the focus tends to be either on the history of
specific technologies, technology companies, or the impact of developments on an
industry (Bannister, 2002).
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The primary intent of this research effort is to produce an initial working model
to demonstrate a historical perspective on the IA aspect of IS. This model can also
provide IA professionals with the support of future initiatives or innovations. A review
of existing literature will attempt to disclose information concerning a model that focused
on the evolution of IA before 1960. While there is some theory of IA and information
system security structures, no current framework focuses on the evolutionary process
prior to 1960. This will be accomplished by the systematic research effort outlined and
supported by research questions discussed in chapter.

Chapter Review
This chapter discussed the detailed methodology used to investigate the research
problem and the proposed theory. This chapter also provided justification for the
historical research method for Management Information Systems (MIS), the National
Security Agency’s Information Assurance Methodology (IAM) and the McCumber and
Maconachy model of Information Assurance.
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III. Background

Introduction
The previous chapter described the detailed methodology used to investigate the
research problem and theory proposed in chapter one. Additionally, the previous chapter
provided justification for using the historical research method for Management
Information Systems (MIS) and the National Security Agency’s Information Assurance
Model (IAM). This chapter explores current literature on the historical perspectives of
warfare and the protection of information from World War I through Vietnam to the
present. This chapter also summarizes background information pertinent to Information
Operations (IO) strategies related to aspects of Defensive Counter Information and the
Information Assurance (IA) domain.

Early History
Before focusing on the current period, I will first explore how early warfare relied
on various methods of protection of pertinent information from the enemy. Exploring the
background of security schemes developed during early warfare will provide a
foundation for discussing American Military warfare from WWI through Vietnam to the
present.
Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, a British Military commander during
World War II, described the information security requirement:
“A good military leader must dominate the events which encompass him;
once events get the better of him he will lose the confidence of his men,
and when that happens he ceases to be of value as a leader. He has
therefore got to anticipate enemy reactions to his own moves, and to take
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steps to prevent enemy interference with his own plans” (Montgomery,
1968: 16).
While Montgomery’s statement demonstrates the power of combat leadership, the
protection of key information helps combat leaders gain significant advantage over
enemies. The domination of events during warfare facilitates the primary goal of IA, to
protect and defend information and information systems (JP3-13, 1998). Confidentiality
is maintained when information relevant to combat plans is safeguarded from enemy
commanders. Throughout the history of the world, records demonstrate how military
commanders have always wanted to safeguard information related to operational
strategies and actions to prevent enemy interference with tactics. At Jericho in 7000
B.C., precautions taken to fortify the city included walls and moats to keep the enemy out
(Montgomery, 1968: 29). These fortifications allowed only enemy speculation of what
was within those walls. Other early methods of safeguarding information came in the
form of torches used for signaling movements; trusted runners used to relay important
messages to commanders; and trumpets or other instruments used to relay battle
commands to soldiers (Montgomery, 1968: 39).
The Arab raiders of early medieval warfare used the element of surprise to gain
advantage over villagers by overwhelming them before they were fully aware of what
was happening (Montgomery, 1968: 145). The element of surprise used by the Arabs
ensured they had an advantage over the people of the countryside. Such actions protected
pertinent battle information until it was too late for a counter attack. The Greeks made
great strides in cryptography, which is recognized as one of the earliest forms of
confidentiality or maintaining privacy of sent messages. They used fires and torches to
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send messages representing letters of the Greek alphabet. Other forms of cryptography
included shaving the heads of slaves, writing messages and concealing the message by
letting the hair grow back. Once the hair returned, the slave was sent to deliver the
message (Churchhouse, 2002). Another method involved the Greek scytale. The scytale
is a wooden pole used as a transposition cipher by the Spartan military. The sender
would write the message along the length of the scytale on a strip of leather or
parchment, and then unwind the strip, which would appear to carry meaningless letters.
A person with a staff of the same size, often fabricated at the same place, would be the
only person able to read the message (Newton, 1998). Such techniques provided key
operational instructions and advanced warnings to commanders in the field. Fires and
torches also provided ways to assist battle ships navigating the Greek shoals (Wrixon,
1998).
At the height of the Roman Empire, Julius Caesar used a combination of signaling
stations and various ciphers to communicate with his generals. Caesar is known as one of
the first persons to have ever employed encryption for the sake of securing messages
during warfare (Morelli, 2002). The Caesar cipher was used by Julius Cesar to
communicate with his armies using Greek letters to mask Latin messages (Wrixon, 1998;
170). This encryption procedure used shifting techniques of the normal alphabet in
plaintext to code messages that were later decoded using a cipher text. The cipher text
identifies the actual alphabet substitution technique (Bosworth, 1982). The techniques
used by leaders of the great Arab, Roman, and Greek Empires were all aimed at
protecting the uninterrupted flow of information, which is a key aspect of IA. These
early examples demonstrate how the true origins of IA are associated with the most
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primitive forms of warfare. They also reveal how the concept of IA has evolved over
time from initiatives and strategic actions taken, which led to military leaders focusing on
the best ways to gain advantage over adversaries.

The New World
The Industrial Revolution, which started in Europe and progressed to the new
world, brought great advancements in weapons, armor, and communications. A major
advancement in communications came in the form of the telegraph. Samuel Morse
invented the telegraph in 1832 (Montgomery, 1968: 420). The telegraph provided a
primary means of communication during the American Civil War. The telegraph also
provided an early electronic system that helped with the advancement of military
communications. “Although telegraph messages were frequently sent in code, the
recipients were relying on the integrity of the telegraph companies than on the codes for
security” (Diffie, 2003). Even though the early telegraphic systems were not developed
to protect sent messages, many devices developed automated the message process. Since
the telegraph was a primary means of communication, both the Union and Confederate
Armies tapped lines. In his book, The Secret War for the Union, Edwin C. Fishel stated
that even though the telegraph had the potential to yield great intelligence, there are
records that indicate tapped lines yielded no pertinent information that could be used by
either side (Fishel, 1996: 4).
During the American Civil War, intelligence collection obtained by the signal
corps became a primary means of obtaining enemy information. Opposing signal corps
would collect intelligence by observing troop movements using signal towers, rooftops,
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and hilltops. Counter measures by both sides often relied on the minimal use of flags,
which would pinpoint their location or other key operational information (Fishel,1996:
5). Such tactics also demonstrate how confidentiality and the protection of sent messages
was the main reason for the development of certain defensive strategies during the Civil
War.
World War I
The military importance of the radio and advancements in communication
technology influenced key decisions in the United States Government during WWI. On
April 7, 1917, all amateur and commercial use of radio came to an abrupt halt as the
United Stated entered into WWI. Radio stations were ordered to shut down or were taken
over by the government. This precautionary measure taken by the United States helped
to ease the growing concern of an ill-prepared U.S. Military to cope with the
communication needs generated by entrance into the war (De Gallaix, 1919). Emergency
measures adopted during the early stages of the U.S. involvement suggest there were no
alternative message systems available prior to this time. According to Diffie (2003), “the
military radio in wartime was so valuable that no one could completely forgo its use.”
However, the problem with the radio was its simple use. From a security standpoint, it
was easy to send and receive transmissions. In order to protect radio transmissions,
military leaders incorporated the use of cryptography as a security measure (Diffie,
2003). According to The History of Codes and Ciphers in the United States during WWI,
four additional factors led to the increased use of codes and ciphers for wartime
communications (Barker, 1979; 126):
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•

The increasing use of wire communications increased the demand
for encryption methods to prevent enemy access.

•

The invention of the steam and gas engine provided greater
mobility of military tactics and increased the need for encryption
methods for communications.

•

The invention of the radio and its speedy adoption for military use.

•

The invention and development of the aircraft and the speedy
adaptation for military operations.

One major communications function during WWI focused on maintaining the
confidentiality of sent messages, which is the fundamental objective of cryptography.
This objective also has other important applications that focus on the authentication of
messages and the protection of sent data (Soergel, 2002). Such techniques rely on the
notion that there is a message; however, it is difficult for unauthorized persons to read or
understand it (Joyce, 2002). Another essential element used in cryptography is
encryption. Encryption is the process to encode a message so that the contents are hidden
to unauthorized individuals (Soergel, 2002). This encoding process is essential to allow a
message to be un-readable by unauthorized persons. Cryptographic systems also use
ciphers and cipher devices. The word cipher is Arabic for “nothing” and is a method of
concealment in which the primary unit, letters of a particular alphabet, are substituted
with other letters, numbers, or symbols. A cipher device is a manual mechanism used to
encrypt and decrypt messages. A cipher is also method of concealing or keeping secret
the meaning of a word, phrase, sentence, or longer message in which the basic unit of
concealment is the letter (Newton, 1997; Wrixon, 1998).
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The greater need for secure communications became apparent when the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF) first arrived in Europe. The AEF’s radio, telephone, and
courier dispatches urgently needed encryption protection (Wrixon, 1998). There were
three cryptographic systems used during high-level communications by the U.S. Army.
The War Department Telegraph Code 1915, The Army Cipher Disk, and The Playfair
Cipher were used throughout the early stages of the war despite the notion that they were
believed to be insecure and unreliable. However, only the War Department Telegraph
Code 1915 and the The Playfair Cipher were used in Europe (Barker, 1979; 126-127).
Since secure communications by encryption was essential to the U.S. Military, leaders
began to focus on the development of other forms of encrypted communication. This led
to the development of several experimental codes by the Code Compilation Sections in
Washington and France that were evaluated by the Military Intelligence branch of the
War Department known as MI-8 (Barker, 1979; 33; Wrixon, 1998). The evaluation of
the various codes led to the development of two-part codes, which were more
complicated and provided greater levels of security. Even though the AEF had limited
knowledge of cryptographic techniques at the beginning of the American entrance into
WWI, by late 1918 the U.S. had made significant strides in ciphers and encipherment
methods.
During the closing days of WWI, eight Choctaw Indians emerged as key
communication specialists to the AEF. During the Mousse-Argonne campaign, the
Choctaw “code talkers” used their native language to encode key information over open
radio channels. Other native Choctaw speakers decoded the messages and conveyed the
information to AEF company commanders. Over the course of a few weeks, they
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handled field telephone calls, translated radio messages, and wrote field orders. German
eavesdroppers who had tapped radio and telephone lines and broken American radio
codes could not interpret the Choctaw language (Green, 1979; Wrixon, 1998; 357).
The successful use of the radio throughout WWI allowed communications
between military units who were considerable distances apart. However, transmission
techniques were also vulnerable to interception by the enemy (Churchhouse, 2002; 111).
Many countries realized that the use of encryption techniques to encipher and decipher
messages could be used for secure communications in future military operations.
Consequently, several developments would shape the future of military secure
communications techniques.
During the 1920’s, one of the most famous crypto graphical machines, Enigma,
was invented by Arthur Scherbius, co-founder of a German engineering firm
(Churchhouse, 2002; 111). Prior to Enigma, there were a number of methods used to
encipher messages. Such methods were based on the use of books of numerals held only
by the sender and the recipient. Each service had its own particular code book with a
multitude of words and phrases likely to be used by a particular service. There were
opposite phrases and words in each numerical group (Winterbothan, 1974; 8)

The

original Enigma was constructed and shown in Vienna in 1923, however, the machine
was not adopted for military use until Adolph Hitler began to rearm Germany during the
late 1920’s. The German High Command (GHC), with counsel from German
cryptographic experts, decided that Enigma offered satisfactory guarantees of security
after several modifications and improvements (Kahn, 1968). The GHC considered the
Enigma machine top-secret and the code unbreakable even though the original machine
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was shown to the public. The GHC eventually equipped all branches of the German
armed forces with the device (Dziewanowski, 2001: Churchhouse, 2002; 132: Haufler,
1999).
The Hagelin cipher machine was another important cipher of the late 1920’s. It
was developed by Boris Hagelin and manufactured in Sweden. The Hagelin cipher could
print and provided greater accuracy than the Enigma machine. It was marketed to any
country and was eventually purchased by Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and France under a variety of names including the M209, C36, C38, and
C41 (Churchhouse, 2002; 133). By 1942 and continuing into the 1950s, improvements to
the Hagelin machine were initiated by the American, French, and Italian militaries. The
machine was modified for improved performance, reduced in size, and mass produced to
support individual war efforts by each country (Kahn, 1968; 426-427).
According to Polish intelligence accounts during the early stages of WWII,
counterintelligence agents intercepted an Enigma machine dispatched from Berlin to the
German legation in Warsaw in 1929. Three years passed before Polish scholars could
break the secret to the German cipher. By 1939 and on the eve of the war, the polish
intelligence service could decode most German messages. After this accomplishment,
the Polish made replicas of Enigma available to allied commanders. They furnished
machines to French and British intelligence officers (Dziewanowski, 2001). Obtaining
and breaking the German cipher would prove significant since the world was on the brink
of the Second World War.
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World War II
The success of the Choctaw code talkers during WWI prompted key military
leaders to find additional Native Indian speakers for tactical combat communications
during the early stages of World War II (WWII). Twenty-five years earlier, there were
only eight Choctaw code talkers during WWI. The Choctaw code talkers were
instrumental in the establishment of other military units composed of other Native Indian
speakers serving as communications specialists. The U.S. Army formed a
communication unit that consisted of seventeen Comanche assigned to the Comanche
Signal Corps of the Army. Like the Choctaws before them, they handled field telephone
calls, translated of radio messages, and used their language with a combination of
specialty crafted military terms to write field orders for radio transmission that could not
be understood by the Germans (Wilson, 1997). Several tribes spoke across enemy lines
in Africa, Sicily and the South Pacific. During 1939 to 1945, the Army tapped Hopi,
Choctaw, Comanche, Kiowa, Winnebago, Seminole, Navajo and Cherokee Americans to
use their languages to communicate. Even though such techniques were considered
secret codes, the Indian tribes were only using their native dialects and not actual codes
(Dorn, 1973).
The most recognized of the code talkers were the Navajo. The Army continued to
use Native Indian speakers to encode and decode vital battle information. However, the
Marine Corps devised a different technique to employ unique Native Indian languages as
secret codes during WWII. During the early stages of WWII, the Japanese
cryptographers had become very efficient at breaking top-secret military codes. Philip
Johnston, who had served with U.S. forces in France and had lived on a Navajo
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reservation as a youth, was convinced the Navajo language could be used a secret code
against Japanese cryptographers (Molnar, 1997; Wilson, 1997). According to Carl
Gorman, one of the original code talkers, “the language was unwritten at the time and
was based solely on the sounds, which made it difficult for others to understand
(Bandrapalli, 1997).” Philip Johnston eventually convinced key Marine Corps leaders of
the potential of the Navajo language. The Navajos were the only Native American Tribe
recruited specifically to be communications specialists. Over 400 Navajos completed
Marine Corps boot camp and wartime training at Camp Pendleton’s code talker school.
The Navajos developed a technique that used native words translated into common
warfare or battle terms (Dorn, 1973; 7). Most were assigned to combat units overseas
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) recommended that a crew of qualified
“talkers” be assigned to each Marine Corps Division and the remaining “talkers” to a
training center in the South Pacific (Dorn, 1973; 60). Eventually the code became the
main method of secret radio communications during pivotal battles in the pacific
(Bandrapalli, 1997; Wilson, 1997). A staff writer for the Marine Corps Magazine, The
Leatherneck, commented on the code talkers:
“Voice Code transmission of operational orders laid the groundwork from
the Solomans straight through Okinawa” (Dorn, 1973; 57).
It is clear the effort and dedication of the code talkers made significant impacts on the
pacific operations of the war. In an interview, Major Howard Conner, the Fifth
Division’s Signal Officer, described how the Navajo code talkers performed during the
Iwo Jima landing:
“The entire operation was directed by the Navajo code….During the two
days that followed the initial landings I had six Navajo radio nets working
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around the clock…They sent and received over 800 messages without
error. Were it not for the Navajo Code Talkers, the Marines never would
have taken Iwo Jima” (Wilson, 1997).
The use of the Navajo code became one method of U.S. secret radio communications
during key battles throughout the pacific theater and was often referred to as “the code
the Japanese couldn’t crack.” The unique relationship between the Navy and the Marine
Corps allowed Navajos based on ships or shore to communicate with each other quickly
and accurately and prevented the enemy from acquiring early knowledge of future events
(Dorn, 1973; 58; Bandrapalli, 1997).
In addition to the Navajo communicators’ ability to transmit secure messages,
there were other significant efforts aimed at secure communications technology. The A-3
scrambler system operated by the American Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T) Company
was considered state of the art technology during WWI, however, during the early stages
of WWII, it was vulnerable to anyone with sophisticated unscrambling capability (Boone
et al, 2000; Weadon, 2000). In an effort to control persistent communication problems,
the U.S. and its allies set out to develop a means to protect their information. Bell
Telephone Laboratories, under the direction of A.B. Clark with assistance from British
mathematician, Alan Turing began to work on “the Green Hornet” which was later
referred to as SIGSALY (Boone et al, 2000; Weadon, 2000). SIGSALY provided “pulse
code modulation”, which is known as the predecessor of present-day innovations as
digital voice, data, and video transmission. Additionally, early applications of spread
spectrum technology were developed. SIGSALY is a device that helped to provide a
springboard into the digital communication world. Formal deployment began and
provided a great advantage to the U.S. and allies in July 1943 because of its ability to
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offer truly secure voice communications at high organizational levels (Boone et al, 2000;
Weadon, 2000).
The resourcefulness of the allied forces to intercept and decode key
communications by the German and Japanese diplomatic and military leadership also
proved vital to the allied war effort. According to the National Security Agency’s
Korean War Background of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), cryptanalytic units expanded
and close ties between the U.S. and Great Britain at the outbreak of WWII facilitated
their efforts. Military and civilian decision makers obtained detailed inside information
about the enemy. The enhanced activity paid off in plentiful and high-quality
information on the Germans and Japanese – their location, armament, and intentions
(Hatch, 2000). During early stages of WWII, the Germans and Japanese were using
various adaptations of Enigma for key communications. Enigma was used to control and
report locations of submarines in the Atlantic and to pass information about bombing
raids, the movement of military units, and the location and cargo of military supply ships
(Adamy, 2003). Unknown to the Germans, their secret communications weapon had
been compromised long before the war began. The Polish success in breaking the secrets
to Enigma and subsequently using the machine to decode German messages would be
vital to allied military operations for American, British and French forces. After an
arrangement between the British and Polish government, the sharing of the Enigma and
relevant intelligence was turned over to the British. The British improved the techniques
developed by the polish at the Government and Cipher School at Bletchley Park, United
Kingdom. The Ultra Secret Intelligence Agency, or “Ultra”, was the result of British
improvements to Polish methods of deciphering at Bletchley Park. This technology was
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later turned over to the American government, who also assigned American military
personnel to Bletchley Park to work on the “Ultra Secret” (Dziewanowski, 2001; Haufler,
1999).
Another major contributor to the code breaking effort of German military
communications was Bombes. Designed to replace several time consuming manual
methods used for the heavy amount of Enigma intercepts, a series of machines known as
Bombes were created to look for certain sequences of characters and comparisons of
various Enigma settings (Lee, 2000). Although the British originally manufactured
Bombes in Europe, the U.S. Navy led the effort to manufacture enhanced Bombes in the
U.S. to combat the growing concern for the German U-Boat codes used to coordinate
attacks on U.S. ships in the Atlantic. The National Cash Register (NCR) Company in
Dayton, Ohio was awarded the contract to manufacture Bombes. The U.S. Bombes were
far superior to previous versions and allowed cryptologists at Bletchley Park to focus on
the production of other code breaking requirements (Lee, 2000).
Even though the information presented above concentrated on the breaking of
German codes and devices center on offensive tactics, it demonstrated the German lack
of effective information and information security practices. The German failure to
practice procedures that led to a greater focus on the security of communications
functions would ultimately lead to allied progress towards victory in the Atlantic and
Pacific. The efforts made by the U.S. and Great Britain to intercept and break German
codes would also prove to be decisive to the overall strength of allied militaries.
The National Security Agency’s Korean War commemoration on signals
intelligence (SIGINT) summarized that by the closing days of WWII, military personnel
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wanted to return to their homes and consequently a large number of personnel left
cryptology for civilian life (Frahm, 2000). From 1945 until the start of the Korean War,
President Truman slashed the military budget in an effort to reduce the deficit created by
the war. Additionally, only the most critical cryptology positions were filled due to
deficit reduction efforts and other, more important, U.S. commitments. Communication
efforts focused on the Soviet Union, which stemmed from increased tensions of the cold
war and the fall of China to the communists. As a result, there were major structural and
doctrinal changes associated with military communications (Frahm, 2000). In 1949, all
three military cryptologic services were centralized under the new Armed Forces Security
Agency (AFSA). In addition, the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Air Force
Security Service (AFSS) also played important roles to the overall communications
posture of the pre Korea timeframe (Weadon, 2000).

Korea
On June 25, 1950, in an effort to reunify the Korean peninsula under communist
rule, the North Koreans launched a massive offensive led by 150 soviet tanks against
South Korea. Within days, the Capital of Seoul was captured and there was a steady push
further south (Frahm, 2000). Prior to the North Korean offensive, the U.S. Government
characterized Korean communication activities as a low-level priority. Intercept
activities and limited cryptographic support in the region centered on the monitoring of
Soviet and Chinese communist activities. Even though there were several intercepts prior
to the beginning of the war, coverage was dropped once analysts confirmed the nonSoviet origin of the material. Major efforts focused on Communications Intelligence
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(COMINT) which centered on the ability of U.S. Forces to conduct communications
intercept activities in support potential offensive operations (Hatch, 2000: Johnson, 2000;
39). According to an assessment of the Korean War conducted by Thomas Johnson
(2000), “the Korean War occurred during a period of struggle in the cryptographic
community. It began a year after the formation of the AFSA and concluded after the
AFSA ship had been scuttled in favor of a new vessel, the National Security Agency.”
As with WWI and WWII, the U.S. was ill prepared to cope with many of the
communications challenges faced during the early stages of the Korean War. In fact,
even though WWII had concluded five years earlier, various stages of the war in Korea
produced a resurrection of WWII communication standards, guidelines, and common
practices, including American strategic level communications (Hatch, 2000). The
dependable SIGABA device, developed from the earlier SIGSALY device, and tools
such as the M-209, secure communications continued to keep American plans and
intentions from the enemy. Many believe that the SIGABA was the most secure
cryptosystem of its era and that no SIGABA traffic or battlefield communications were
read during the latter stages of WWII or Korea (Diffie, 2003; Weadon, 2000).
Most of the U.S. communications strategies focused on maintaining a steady flow of
enemy intelligence and security concerns aimed at protection of information and
personnel. In personal interviews conducted by John G. Westover with members of the
United States Army who served during the Korean conflict, there is a clear indication that
certain factors contributed to the security of information. Many of these factors relate to
the four dimensions of IA; information states, information characteristics, security
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countermeasures, and time discussed earlier. Several of these personal accounts are
provided below (Westover, 1987; 87-106):
•

LtCol. George Lieberberg, Signal Section, HQ Eighth Army.
“Since there was no anticipation of this war and the U.S. priorities
were concentrated elsewhere, military personnel staffing to the
region was a major concern. The first order was to dispatch troops
with communications specialties from Japanese region to the
Korean.”

•

Capt. John W. Pierce, 24th Signal Company. “Although wire is the
primary method of signal communications, in Korea we had to use
very high frequency (VHF) radio because distance, speed, terrain,
and road nets limited the use of wire.” “The isolation of the VHF
terminals was a major concern….The isolation of the U.S Forces
also brought a serious security problem. With no headquarters
personnel nearby to provide security, we sometimes requested help
from the Korean National Police. I did not have much faith in the
personnel of this force, and in some cases it was better to use our
signalmen as guards.”

•

Capt. Frank D. Secan, 304th Signal Operation Battalion. “In
teaching about VHF radio, instructors often place more emphasis
on the difficulties of line-of-sight than is necessary. VHF waves
bend, bounce, and do many other tricks. I have aimed such waves
up valleys, through mountain passes, and once directed my beam
directly at a large mountain – yet had the signal clearly received.”
“I have seen a number of VHF stations located on the crests of
hills and mountains to take advantage of line-of-sight. On the
slope you can get out of the wind, with its consequent technical
troubles and personal discomforts much easier.”

•

Capt. Wayne A. Striley, 71st Signal Service Battalion. “The
destruction of signal equipment was greater in Korea that in
WWII.” “The key cable used for Korea’s telephone-telegraph
system was in pretty bad condition from bomb explosions,
artillery, and mortar fire.”

•

SFC Richard L. Albrecht, Headquarters, 24th Division Artillery.
“In their enthusiasm to get messages delivered, a number of
message centers sent communications by several methods. All
classified messages – even those labeled Restricted – had to be
encoded before they could be transmitted by radio. It always
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seemed we got our coded messages at night. It was normal most
evenings fo the code clerk to work several hours on messages, only
to find that the same messages had already been received by
courier and distributed.”
•

Lt. Arthur J. Cramer, 7th Signal Company. “The entire
cryptography system is cumbersome under the best conditions, but
it is intolerable when it is not working properly. Typical of the
conditions that slow up the system were the over-classified
messages. We received so many five day old Flash (highest
priority) messages from X corps that they became a joke.” “Our
cryptographers were overburdened with long messages that were
also forwarded by some other (and often faster) method. Many
times at night I would awaken my whole crew to get them working
on a number of long messages – only to find they had previously
been received by telephone in the clear, or had been brought by
courier.”

•

From Signal, November-December 1951. “Carrying messages by
plane is nothing new, but in Korea it has become important. Jeep,
or motor messenger service, had always received more use until
the Korean campaign made getting messages from one battlefield
to another more difficult.” “The airplane performs an important
job which is as old as warfare: getting the message through.” “The
answer to the bad roads was the light airplane, the L-5, or
“mosquito”.”

As acknowledged in the personal accounts above, U.S. forces persevered under extreme
conditions to ensure the protection of information and information systems during the
Korean War. Key concepts of these personal accounts demonstrate how poor staffing,
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, redundant practices, inexperience, and various other
factors led to innovations and practices that evolved into vital concepts that align with the
four dimensions of IA discussed by Maconachy (2001).
Another factor that affected the security of information was press releases that
provided too much information on the exploitation of enemy communications. To limit
such activities, military leadership implemented drastic measures such as suspending
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COMINT operational support to battlefield commanders until key security concerns were
alleviated (Johnson, 2000: 56).
COMSEC during the Korean War demonstrated a fluid tactical situation during
the early stages of the fighting. This led to the destruction of high-level machine ciphers
to prevent their capture (Finnegan, 1998: 114). Other COMSEC vulnerabilities centered
on the general lack of a vigilance and awareness by service members, which increased
the number of security violations. These violations were normally taken lightly due to
more important problems like the general speed and availability of communications for
the war fighter (Finnegan, 1998; 150).
The closing stages of the Korean war saw changes in national security policies
and overall defensive management structures that aligned with the new Presidential
administration and a general dissatisfaction of the American public. This dilemma
centered on recently ended fighting with the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953. As
with the previous wars, military personnel levels were reduced in favor of “lean” forces.
Additionally, the concentration on warfighting capabilities that included tactical nuclear
weapons led to various revamping strategies focusing on the Soviet threat (Fennigan,
1998: 122).
Other developments during the 1950s included the Army Security Agency’s
(ASA) awareness of possible security concerns stemming from emissions of electronic
data processing equipment. The ASA initiated a program named TEMPEST. The
function of TEMPEST related concepts center on compromising emanations generated by
electromagnetic radiation, which interferes with radiation and could possibly leak
information about the data being processed on an unprotected machine (Kuhn, 1998). To
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counter the threat posed by TEMPEST and other security concerns, the ASA formed
boards to provide long range planning and research into programs that would counter the
threat to electronic data processing equipment that might compromise security (Fennigan,
1988; 129).

Vietnam
As with previous wars, the period leading up to the Vietnam War provided the
opportunity of the American leadership to establish programs that would focus on
restructuring and reallocating personnel and resources to other, more important missions
(Fennigan, 1998: 121). During the early stages of the Vietnam War, ASA companies
provided communications support for tactical units throughout Vietnam. Initially, such
practices were aligned with police type functions of monitoring friendly communications
and warning of possible compromises. Many military personnel also assumed that the
enemy was unsophisticated and that communications security did not warrant much
concern (Myer, 1982: 64). Early policies were determined to be ineffective and time
consuming to implement. Consequently, the ASA developed a new concept of “before
the fact” assistance by having personnel serve as advisers rather than police officers.
This new function emphasized the importance of planning operational communications
procedures and the absolute necessity of communications security (Fennegan, 1998: 152).
Basic techniques included changing call signs and frequencies and using codes for map
coordinates. However, such techniques proved to be cumbersome and controversial due
in part to the confusion of changes involving call signs and naming functions that were
derogatory or degrading to U.S. Forces in the theater of operations (Myer, 1982: 65).
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According to documentation compiled by Major General Joseph McChristian
(1974) in his book, Vietnam Studies: The role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967:
“The need for an accurate system to account for the large number of
classified documents was a primary concern since the security of
information was the focal point for the significant intelligence effort in the
Republic of Vietnam.”
Many initiatives and directives spawned from the security concerns during the Vietnam
conflict. After the Counterintelligence division conducted command wide inventories of
all classified material, it was determined there was a need to reduce the amount of
classified material stored to decrease the likelihood of compromises.
The United States Military Assistance Command’s (MAC) security policies and
procedures provided key information on classified material that included the following:
•

Number of classified documents
o on hand at the beginning of the reporting period
o on hand as the end of the reporting period

•

Number of new documents generated

•

Number destroyed

•

Number dispatched

•

Number downgraded.

Additionally, security control officers were trained to supervise overall security measures
and practices and stress the importance of continuous security education (McChristian,
1974: 143). Even though the MAC established several policies and regulations
governing COMSEC, many commanders disregarded the regulations and chose to
sacrifice security considerations for speed and availability of communications. Such
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decisions were much easier since satisfactory COMSEC often produced paralyzing
confusion and an overall displeasure.
The establishment of Army Regulations 380-5, Safeguarding Defense
Information, significantly improved the information security (INFOSEC) posture, which
is the basis for the Command Information Security Program. In the early stages of this
initiative, several instances revealed the lack of attention to detail, however, as the
inspections became rapid, widespread improvements indicated that overall security
training, education, and awareness increased command interest and helped to limit
security violations and inconsistencies (McChristian, 1974: 145). This regulation and
other initiatives provided an efficient security posture throughout the remainder of the
conflict:
•

Announced and unannounced inspections revealed inattention to basic
security.

•

Inspections and surveys improved the security posture of commands.

•

Restrictive services served to remind all personnel of their security
responsibility.

•

Directives outlining the specific requirements for a security program.

•

Full favorable personnel security investigations for Vietnamese
applicants prior to employment in administrative, logistical, and
custodial positions.

•

Modified storage requirements to fit the capabilities of tactical units
and advisory teams.

•

Documents clearly marked with security classifications.

•

The establishment of a “common need” for personnel access to
sensitive data.
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Other security devices enhanced the overall posture of the U.S. Military during the
conflict. A key development was the implementation of the NESTOR family of
narrowband secure voice equipment. Some devices included in the NESTOR family
were, the KY-8 (Stationery Vehicle Use); KY-28 (Aircraft Use); and the KY-38
(Manpack or Mobile Use). Other devices, aimed at the mobility of military personnel,
were the PRC-77 and VRC-12 used in combination with the KY-38 (Myer, 1982: 68-70).
In addition to the establishment of key INFOSEC regulations, the Vietnam
Conflict brought major policy initiatives governing COMSEC. During the early stages of
the war, COMSEC was a police-type function aimed at monitoring friendly
communications and warning of possible compromises. This “after the fact”
management of communication resources proved inefficient and at times, costly to
military operations various activities. After such vulnerabilities were identified, the ASA
progressed to a system that concentrated on “before the fact” assistance that led to the
establishment of operational communications procedures and iterating the importance of
COMSEC to military organizations (Finnegan, 1998; 152). During March 1970, the
Military Assistance Command compiled a series of lessons learned outlining key issues
effecting American Military units in Vietnam. According to Vietnam Lessons Learned
Number 79: Enemy exploitation of tactical communication (USMAC, 1970), there were
several problems with COMSEC:
“The continuous employment of unauthorized codes, lack of proper
communication discipline, and disregard of existing regulations, directives
and specified procedures continue to provide the enemy with valuable and
extremely timely intelligence information…..continued disregard for
approved codes is constantly providing the enemy with timely intelligence
which can be exploited for foil allied operations.”
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It is evident from the information provided from lessons learned documentation that more
regulations with a greater emphasis was needed for “sound and secure communication
techniques that strictly adhered to new and existing regulations” (USMAC, 1970).
The closing stages of Vietnam in 1973 occurred during the same time as the
explosion of technologies related to the Internet, networking, and security become
prevalent throughout the U.S. The significance of such events will continue to influence
technological changes for the future and serve as a catalyst for military warfare. As the
Internet became a catalyst for distributed systems, so did the need for greater security of
information and information systems. The early history of the Internet highlights how
increased use of Internet led to the identification of vulnerabilities discovered during
events that could be considered unintentional acts that led to the identification of major
concerns.

The History of the Internet
Although the U.S. Government was responsible for creating the predecessor to
today’s internet, it was not originally designed to transfer information critical to U.S.
national security (Beauregard, 2001). However, today’s internet is used for a seemingly
infinite number of purposes, including key military communications and operations that
enable the U.S. Military to maintain the highest level of combat readiness. Although
internet related technology has changed how warfare is conducted, the use of information
in war has been a basic warfighting requirement throughout history (Gumahad, 1997).
The history of the Internet provides an explanation of how IA programs evolved
from necessary security measures taken by organizations. The Department of Defense
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(DOD) is an organization that heavily relies on the Internet to conduct modern
information operations. The protection and defense of information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, identification, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation was not a direct result of a single initiative but a continuous iteration of
smaller -- individual efforts directed towards increased performance and efficiency
systems we now know as the Internet. The Internet evolved over a very short period to
become one of the most important systems available for military use. Even though
modern IO is information and Internet intensive, early IO programs also focused on the
protection of information from the enemy. This newer requirement will still focus on the
core concept of protection.
The first signs of the need for increased protection and defense were not so
obvious during the creation of the Internet in 1969. It began as the ARPANET, a major
government and academic research institute in the United States funded by the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the U. S. Department of Defense (Hurd, 2001;
Longstaff, 1997). The original goal was to create a network that would continue to
function even if major sections of the network failed. Longstaff and others identified this
concept as the rerouting of network traffic automatically around problems in connecting
systems or in passing along necessary information. Such efforts were only seen as
network openness and flexibility, which provided optimal services and performance to
the small group of users.
As the affordable personal computer became available with the advent of smaller,
more powerful computers, the 1980s saw an explosion in computer use by the average
person (Hurd, 2001). In 1986, Cliff Stoll identified the first well-publicized international
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security incident related to the Internet in his book, The Cuckoo’s Egg. He identified an
accounting error, which led him to uncover an international effort to exploit university
and government computers by accessing and copying information from them (Stoll,
1989). According to Longstaff et al (1997), Stoll was the first to raise awareness to
potential problems by identifying key ARPANET vulnerabilities that could be used for
destructive purposes.
In 1988, Robert T. Morris, then a student at Cornell University, wrote a program
that would connect to one computer another; find and use one of several vulnerabilities to
copy itself to a second computer; and begin to run the copy of itself at the new location.
A “worm” is the name of a computer program that automatically copies and replicates
itself. Experts identified the Morris Worm was as the first automated network security
incident against the ARPANET. The ARPANET extended to over 88,000 computers and
was the primary means of communication among government network computer experts
at the time of the incident. With the ARPANET effectively down, it was difficult to
coordinate a response to the problem (Longstaff, 1997).
The network grew extensively over a short period and was vital to the daily
operations of the ARPANET. It was important to find a way to prevent security disasters
from occurring in the future. The solution was the creation of the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) coordination center to respond to network emergencies (Zakon,
2000). Today, CERT teams are widely known throughout the computer security world.
Various teams from branches of the military coordinate responses to computer security
incidents, assist sites in handling attacks, and educate network users about computer
security threats and preventive practices.
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The ARPANET officially became the Internet, the concept of a worldwide
network of computers sharing information. It moved from a government research project
to an operational network with over 100,000 computers in 1989 (Hurd, 2001; Zakon,
2000). Such rapid growth also led to more security incidents and new opportunities for
additional network attacks. The growth of the internet prompted users to take a closer
look at various security incidents and network attacks. Since the internet had become so
valuable, it was necessary to take greater precautions to protect resources. The protection
of resources was also a major problem since the many early network protocols that
formed part of the internet infrastructure were designed without security in mind
(Longstaff, 2000). This overall design made it difficult to manage various security
aspects.

Security of the Internet and Information Systems
The exponential growth in internet security incidents from 1988 to 1995
demonstrates the importance of protecting the internet and information systems.
According to experts, there are six reasons why the internet is vulnerable (Longstaff,
2000):
•

Early network protocols designed without security in mind.

•

Openness of the internet allows attacks to be quick, inexpensive and
un-detectable.

•

Sites have unwarranted trust and are unaware of the risks.

•

Rapid development of internet related services and applications.

•

Operating system security not considered at purchasing.
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•

Explosive growth has expanded the need for well-trained and
experienced managers.

The six reasons identified above have caused organizations to take a closer look at the
security of their systems. Figure 4 shows growth of the number of network security
incidents from 1988 to 1995. The facts presented give justification for greater security
measures of information and information systems.

Figure 4: Security Incidents. 1988-1995 (CERT/CC, 2000)
This figure begins with the year 1988 and related data did not exist before this time. The
protection of information in warfare has always been a key aspect of U.S. Military
operations even though pertinent data related to the Internet is only available since 1988.
The military currently uses the internet for an infinite number of purposes. As
Internet and Internet related technologies continue to revolutionize military operations,
there are certain concepts developed over time that necessitate understanding of key
warfare elements and the importance of protecting vital information and systems.
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Because of this rapid growth, this necessity will further validate the importance of
protecting pertinent information used for such purposes in the future.

Information Assurance Strategy
According to the Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) on Information
Operations, IA is a subcategory of the Information Warfare (IW) under the Counter
Information domain. The sub-domains of Offensive Counter Information (OCI) and
Defensive Counter Information (DCI) form the nucleus of attack and defend operations
performed during warfare. A recent research effort described this relationship:
“Information Superiority gives the U.S. the ability to control information
even on an insecure network such as the Internet. Since Information
Superiority cannot be obtained and maintained without Information
Assurance, to control the Information Operations spectrum the military
must have the ability to protect its own information, detect any
unauthorized intrusions, and react to those intrusions in a timely manner
(Beauregard, 2001).”
OCI and DCI tactics, techniques, and procedures ensure significant advantage
over adversaries and help to achieve military objectives aimed at IS (AFDD-1,
1998: 3). These two counter information categories, OCI and DCI, also exist
simultaneously by protecting against potential vulnerabilities and exploiting the
enemy’s vulnerabilities.
IA focuses strictly on DCI tactics, techniques, and procedures that ensure
protection, detection, and reaction to potential problems. The current IA structure
makes the goal of information superiority easier to achieve. Although there are
several other concepts represented under the DCI category, this research effort
only focuses on the elements associated with IA since it is viewed as the
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foundation of any defensive strategy for the protection of information and
information systems (AFDD-1, 1998: 3).

Information Superiority
Information Operations

Information-In-Warfare
Gain

Information Warfare
Attack

Exploit

Defend

Counter Information

ISR
Weather
Navigation & Positioning
Other Information Collection
Dissemination Activities

Offensive
Counter Information
PSYOP
Electronic Warfare
Military Deception
Physical Attack
Information Attack

Defensive
Counter Information
Information Assurance
OPSEC
Counter Intelligence
Counter PSYOP
Electronic Protection
Counter Deception

Figure 5: Air Force Information Superiority Construct (AFDD-1, 1998: 3)

The origins of the current IA structure and overall concept are embedded in earlier
defensive strategies such as communications security (COMSEC) and information
security (INFOSEC). According to the United States Marine Corps Institute’s (USMCI)
correspondence course on COMSEC (1998), it is a reversible weapon:
“We will not win battles, unless our forces receive and preserve vital
intelligence. We also cannot win battles, if the enemy receives this
intelligence as readily as we do. Communications security, therefore, is an
integral part of reliable communications which may prove to be the key to
victory on the modern battlefield.”
COMSEC is that protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized
persons information of value from the study of communications. Essentially, the primary
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purpose of COMSEC is to deny unauthorized persons or to protect valuable information
obtained from studying communications. COMSEC is resultant of the need for military
commanders to safeguard information during conflicts. Primarily, the U.S. Military has
streamlined such concepts to achieve a certain level of reliable and secure
communications. A balanced approach to the theory of COMSEC has four essential
components of COMSEC: transmission security, physical security, cryptographic
security, and emission security (USMCI, 1998).
•

Transmission security is the protection of all transmissions and denial
or reduction of the effectiveness of interception, traffic analysis,
imitative deception, and radio direction finding.

•

Physical security is the protection of classified communications
equipment and material from unauthorized personnel.

•

Cryptographic security is development and use of technically sound
cryptosystems, and the application of proper crypto techniques.

•

Emission security involves measures taken to deny unauthorized
persons information of value that might be obtained from interception
and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptographic and
telecommunications systems.

The four components of COMSEC contribute to the protection of various systems, which
is essential to IA concepts of confidentiality and integrity discussed in chapter one.
INFOSEC or information systems security is the protection of information
systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information. This protection
takes place against the denial of service to authorized users, whether in storage,
processing or transit (Maconachy, Schou, and Welch, 2001). According to the approach
taken by the authors, this historical definition of INFOSEC lacks stability as a stand alone
concept under the current IA structure. Maconachy et al (2001) argued that INFOSEC
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was an attempt to integrate separate disciplines like personal security, computer security
and communications security into a coherent identifiable profession. Since INFOSEC
primarily focuses on the protection of information and information systems from
modification or disruptions in accessibility, it cannot support the larger spectrum of
separate disciplines as originally intended. According to McCumber (1998), “even
though COMSEC and INFOSEC provide system security support, merely combining
these disciplines under an umbrella of common management will fail to capture an
accurate view of this evolving technology.” He advocated an approach that emphasizes
the cornerstone of information systems security, information, and the technology that
facilitates it.
Maconachy et al (2001), argued that the evolution of IA and the inception of the
IA model began during the 1960’s and progressed with the escalation of the information
intensive environment of the late 1960’s and beyond. There is clear evidence that
demonstrates how many concepts of IA are present in the earliest military conflicts.
Other examples demonstrate how information and information systems protection
evolved during various military conflicts throughout American History. The information
provided below will explore how IA approaches have origins in military conflicts from
WWI through Vietnam.

Information Assurance Evolutionary Model Development
Applying the NSA IAM baseline categories to information presented earlier will
assist in the development the overall plan to categorize concepts of the current
evolutionary framework of IA. Additionally, the identification of key aspects of
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Information States and Security Counter Measures previously explained by the
McCumber IA model will influence the value obtained from the historical information. I
will categorize previous technological mechanisms discovered from WWI through
Vietnam to the present using the information states, security countermeasures, and the
examples that correspond to each. According to Maconachy’s theory and the NSA IAM
baseline classification system, this categorization must also take place across the
temporal domain. This explained by the forth dimension, as the forth dimension, time
explains. Table 3, shows the temporal domain along with the IA model dimensions and
the NSA IAM categories. This table will demonstrate early examples of information and
information systems protection mechanisms during warfare.
Table 3: IA Evolution Model Core Elements
IA Model Dimensions
Information States
Transmission

WWI, WWII, Korea,
Vietnam

-----------Time ------------

Storage
Processing
Security Counter Measures
Technology

Early Examples of
Information
and
Information Systems
Protection Mechanisms
During Warfare

NSA IAM Baseline
Categories
External Connectivity
Back-Ups
Disposal
Auditing
Session Controls
Maintenance
Telecommunications
Virus Protection

Policies and Practices

Account Management
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
IA Documentation
IA Roles & Responsibilities
Media Sanitization

People

Awareness
Personnel Security
Physical Security
Training

-----------Time ------------
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In addition to the three dimensions provided above, the representation of the
security services dimension will address which of the five pillars; availability,
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation are more prevalent under
each of the four wars. This dimension, along with indicators for IA in each war, is added
after each category is presented across the temporal domain and during the final analysis
of this research.

Justification
Temporal piece, developed from the Maconachy model and the NSA IAM,
focuses on the period from WWI to Vietnam and those IA concepts common during
military operations. Looking at the six stages of MIS historical research (McKenny,
1997) from chapter two, a crisis always ensued, which led to innovations and
improvements in key areas. Wartime operations, or crisis and conflict, enhances the
significance of overall war plans. This is the time when lessons learned and doctrinal
changes are organized and the production working documents form key organizational
changes. This notion is confirmed by the information contained in JP 3-13 (1998) on the
IO function provided in chapter one. JP 3-13 demonstrated how IA was the only element
of IO represented across the entire spectrum from peace, to crisis, to conflict, and to
peace again with crisis and conflict being the critical timeframe.

Assumptions
The mapping of the baseline categories and the items listed under the Maconachy
IA model under the proposed IA framework could fall into simultaneous areas or could
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be defined differently in various literature depending on the specific criteria used. It is
important to establish guidelines and focus on a common or major function and not by
how each concept is implemented. The focus of this effort concentrated on the major
functions of each concept to determine where each would fit in the development of the
evolutionary model. The definitions of each dimension by Maconachy provided a
general guideline for conducting a thorough categorization and will be used to formulate
the various concepts of the evolutionary model explained below.

Approach to Model
Various lessons learned during warfare were attempts to outline actions taken to
reduce the likelihood of security incidents linked to various leadership functions. The
notion of speed or convenience versus security or inconvenience was a major issue. IA
related concepts have been at the forefront of military operations during warfare.
Operations are shaped by doctrinal changes that take place during and after a specific
crises and outlined in lessons learned reports. Prior to additional classifications from the
Maconachy model and the NSA IAM baseline, I will categorize previous technological
mechanisms discovered from during the specific time frame covered using the
information states and security counter measures dimensions.
The proposed model will provide discussion according to the sub-categories.
Such a classification using the temporal domain will attempt to tie each of the wars with
the four dimensions. Preceding each category discussion, I will provide a row vector of
Maconachy IA model dimensions including the temporal addition and the segmentation
of the pertinent details according to the NSA IAM - IA map.
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Information States
The transmission state progressed steadily from a very basic function during
WWI and WWII into a much more robust function during Korea and Vietnam. The
primary theme was to provide accurate information to key entities in a timely and
accurate manner. The radio was widely known as the sole source of electronic
communications. The significance of the radio throughout the periods covered can be
demonstrated by the wide use and the innovations to radio related technology over time.
Table 4 demonstrates the transmission element across the temporal domain.
Table 4: Transmission Element
World War I

Transmission

Courier Dispatch
Radio
Tactical
Telephone
Telegraph

World War II
Couriers
Radio
Tactical
Telephone
Telegraph

Korea
Couriers
Message Centers
HF Radio
Telephone

Vietnam
Message Centers
VHF Radio (FM)
Telephone

Baseline
External
Connectivity

The storage element continued to progress by gradually growing more streamlined with
the introduction of new technologies to accommodate various changes over time. The
storage dimension focuses on maintaining control and protecting an uninterrupted flow of
information by keeping original copies in safe places (Maconachy, 2001). Early on, this
process was manual and relied on the human element to provide system protection and
availability. During Korea, a more progressive filing system and microfiche technology
was developed and provided greater levels of security previously unavailable. Table 5
demonstrates the storage element across the temporal domain.
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Table 5: Storage Element
World War I

Storage

Manual Archive
- Locally

World War II

Manual Archive
- File System
Dev.

Korea
Microfiche
- Systemized
Archive
- Formal
Retrieval
System
Developed

Vietnam

Centralized
Storage Fac.
Magnetic Tape
Paper Tape

Baseline

Back-Ups
Disposal

The processing element focuses on how information and information systems are
protected during the preparation or interpretation stages (Maconachy, 2001). Coding and
decoding expertise provided a primary means of processing various information. Even
though coding and decoding provides either manual of automated functions, key elements
focused on continuous improvement. The processing function has continued to be a key
concern for military leadership, as demonstrated by examples taken from WWI and
WWII. Later developments if this element focused on providing automated processes
and centralized locations to conduct operations. Table 6 demonstrates the processing
element across the temporal domain.
Table 6: Processing Element

Processing

World War I

World War II

Choctaw Talkers
Manualcoding/decoding

Navajo Talkers
Indian Talkers
Manual coding/decoding

Korea
Message Centers
Semi-Automated coding/decoding

Vietnam
Centralized Message
Processing
Automated coding/decoding

Baseline

Auditing
Session Controls

Security Counter Measures
The technology element includes many of the cryptographic systems of the past,
which provided key advantages to both enemy and friendly combatants during warfare
(Maconachy, 2001).

During WWII, the U.S. military developed technologies and
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improved on others developed elsewhere. Many of these technological advancements
developed during WWII carried over to the Korean War. The Vietnam War also
provided advancements in technology that led to internet related hardware and software
developments. Table 7 demonstrates the technology element across the temporal domain.
Table 7: Technology Element
World War I

Technology

Scramblers
- Shift Ciphers

World War II
Enigma
Hagelin
Ultra
Bombes
Purple
SIGSALY
M-209

Korea

SIGSALY
M-209
SIAGBA

Vietnam

Baseline

NESTOR (Secure
Voice)
- KY-8
- KY-28
- KY-38
- PRC-77
Transistors

Maintenance
Telecommunicati
ons
Virus Protection

The policies and practices element incorporates established procedures and concepts
mandated by organizational leadership. This element continued to progress throughout
American warfare and certain indicators demonstrate how prevalent certain concepts
became as various wars progressed. Table 8 demonstrates the policies and practices
element across the temporal domain.
Table 8: Policies and Practices Element
World War I

Policies
and
Practices

Encryption
Code Books

World War II

Code Books
COMINT
Encryption
SIGINT

Korea

Code Books
COMINT
Encryption
INFO-OPS
- Press Releases
SIGINT
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Vietnam
COMINT
COMSEC
Encryption
INFOSEC
Information
Operations
- Press Releases
- Pol Pressure
Press Releases
OPSEC
Security Policies
- Encryption
- Documents
SIGINT
TEMPEST

Baseline

Account
Management
Configuration
Management
Contingency
Planning
IA Documentation
IA Roles &
Responsibilities
Media Sanitization

The people element evolved from a decentralized structure to a more centralized one over
time. The perception that people required awareness, literacy, training, and education
led to a more centralized structure. As the need for greater role by communications
leaders, so did the need for more structure governed by rules and regulations. Table 9
demonstrates the people element across the temporal domain.
Table 9: People Element
World War I

People

World War II

Decentralized
Specialized
Upper - Echelons

No Structure
Decentralized

Korea
Centralized
Training
Programs
Awareness
Functions

Vietnam
Highly
Centralized
High Level
Training
Compliance Enforcement

Baseline
Awareness
Personnel
Security
Physical Security
Training

Security Services
The security services dimension focuses on the five key aspects of IA. Using the
terms as defined earlier by this research effort, I categorized each by mapping the
definition with the relevant examples provided throughout the information states and the
security counter measures dimensions. An overall categorization that focuses on the key
concepts identified throughout the proposed evolutionary framework. Indicators
demonstrate that across the temporal domain, pertinent details of the current IA structure
increased through time and led to the current structure of IA.
Table 10: Security Services Dimension

Security
Services

World War I

World War II

Korea

Vietnam

Current

Confidentiality
Integrity

Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity

Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity

Authentication
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity

Authentication
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Non-Repudiation
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Chapter Overview
This chapter discussed current literature on the historical perspectives of warfare
and the protection of information from World War I forward. This chapter also
summarized background information pertinent to Information Operations (IO) strategies
related to aspects of DCI and the IA domain as well as a brief history of the Internet and
how advancements in networking technologies led to IA principles and practices.
Finally, this chapter discussed the information assurance evolutionary process and its
relationship to the warfare perspectives over time.
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IV. Analysis

Introduction
The previous chapter explored current literature on the historical perspectives of
warfare and the protection of information from World War I forward and summarized
background information pertinent to Information Operations (IO) strategies related to
aspects of Defensive Counter Information and the Information Assurance (IA) domain.
This chapter will discuss the findings of this research effort by answering the research
questions presented in chapter one.

Analysis of Historical Factors
Historical research takes into account past occurrences and their significant
contribution to present and future events. Within the context of this research effort, past
occurrences are examined to answer various questions proposed earlier. The following
section will include information from previous chapters covering core elements of the
evolutionary process.

Research Question One
The first research question asks, “What key programs were established to protect
information and information systems in the U.S. Military from WWI through Vietnam to
the present?” In order to answer this question, I analyzed pertinent documentation from
each U.S. Military conflict since WWI. My research confirmed there were several
programs established to protect information and information systems. Many served
specific operational purposes. For example, several security devices of the Vietnam War
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such as the Integrated Wideband Communications System addressed the need for high
quality communications systems for high-speed data requirements. Other enhancements
focused on the goal of increasing mobility of the war fighter while also increasing
information security related functions (Rienzi, 1972).
The two main programs established to protect information and information
systems were COMSEC and INFOSEC (McCumber, 2001). COMSEC is protection
resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value
that is obtained from studying communications. Essentially, the primary purpose of
COMSEC is to deny unauthorized persons or to protect valuable information obtained by
using four essential security components; transmission security, physical security,
cryptographic security, and emission security (USMCI, 1998). Even though the four
essential components of COMSEC primarily deal with technical requirements, policies
and practices established under this realm provide key functional areas by which detailed
security plans were developed.
INFOSEC is the protection of information systems against unauthorized access to
or modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit and against the
denial of service to authorized users. It also includes those measures necessary to detect,
document, and counter threats. (Maconachy, 2001). INFOSEC focuses on the
Information State dimensions discussed in the Maconachy IA model. This model
provides justification that information resides in one or more of the three states at any
given time. This is further validated by the evolutionary process examples identified
during the military conflicts from WWI to Vietnam discussed in Chapter Three.
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Research Question Two
The second research question asks, “What is an appropriate evolutionary model of
IA given military operations from WWI through Vietnam to the present?” In order to
answer this question, there must first be an overall outline of what information must be
included. An appropriate IA evolutionary model should include the following:
•

Incorporates historical perspectives with current criteria.

•

Thoroughly defined approaches to historical data.

•

Focuses on a specific period.

•

Uses historical time and space.

•

Incorporates the four dimensions discussed by McCumber and Maconachy.

•

Focuses on the five pillars of current IA.

•

Comprehensive approach to identifying key concepts.

I analyzed information presented from WWI to Vietnam in chapter three using the NSA
IAM baseline categories as a foundation. This information covers the evolutionary
processes related to IA that were prevalent in each military conflict. The model below
demonstrates how the four dimensions; information states, security counter measures, and
time were significant throughout American military warfare from WWI through Vietnam
to the present. Additionally, the two dimensions show the significance of the baseline
categories and the mapping to the Information States (transmission, storage, processing)
and Security Counter Measures (technology, policies & practices, people). Since the
mapping incorporates current concepts, the overall product should demonstrate the notion
that older concept do relate to newer ones.
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Table 11: IA Evolutionary Model (WWI to Vietnam)
World War I

World War II

Korea

Vietnam

Baseline

Information
States
Courier Dispatch
Radio
Tactical
Telephone
Telegraph

Couriers
Radio
Tactical
Telephone
Telegraph

Couriers
Message Centers
HF Radio
Telephone

Message Centers
VHF Radio (FM)
Telephone

External
Connectivity

Storage

Manual Archive
- Locally

Manual
Archive
- File System
Developed

Microfiche
- Systemized
Archive
- Formal Retrieval
Sys Developed

Centralized Storage
Facilities
Magnetic Tape
Paper Tape

Back-Ups
Disposal

Processing

Choctaw Talkers
Manualcoding/decoding

Navajo Talkers
Indian Talkers
Manual code/decode

Message Centers
Semi-Automated code/decode

Centralized Message Processing
Automated code/decode

Auditing
Session Controls

Scramblers
- Shift Ciphers

Enigma,
Hagelin
Ultra
Bombes,
Purple
SIGSALY
M-209

SIGSALY
M-209
SIAGBA

NESTOR (Secure Voice)
- KY-8, - KY-28
- KY-38, - PRC-77
Transistors

Maintenance
Telecommunications
Virus Protection

Encryption
Code Books

Code Books
COMINT
Encryption
SIGINT

Code Books
COMINT
Encryption
INFO-OPS
- Press Releases
SIGINT

COMINT, OMSEC
Encryption, INFOSEC
Information Operations
- Press Releases
- Pol Pressure
Press Releases, OPSEC
Security Policies
- Encryption
- Documents
SIGINT, TEMPEST

Account
Management
Configuration
Management
Contingency
Planning
IA Documentation
IA Roles &
Responsibilities
Media Sanitization

No Structure
Decentralized

Decentralized
Specialized
Upper Echelons

Centralized
Training Programs
Awareness
Functions

Highly Centralized
High Level Training
Compliance -Enforcement

Awareness
Personnel Security
Physical Security
Training

Transmission

Counter
Measures

Technology

Policies
and
Practices

People

Security
Services

World War I

World War II

Confidentiality
Integrity

Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity

Korea
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity
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Vietnam
Authentication
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity

Baseline
Authentication
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Non-Repudiation

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to demonstrate what evolutionary
processes are evident throughout the periods covered. This model shows pertinent details
of each conflict, the corresponding information states and security counter measures, and
the NSA IAM baseline categories. The model also demonstrates how current
technologies form elements of the evolutionary time dimension, which coincide with
each of the American wars. Finally, the model demonstrates the applicability of each of
the four dimensions to the current framework structure.
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V. Discussion, Limitations and Recommendations

Discussion
The goal of this research effort is to develop a historical account of events and
concepts related to information and information systems protection during warfare. The
previous chapter discussed the findings of this research effort by answering two of the
three research questions presented in chapter one. This chapter will answer the final
research question and discuss the conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for
future research.

Research Question Three
The third research question asks, “What lessons can we learn from the
implementation of IA programs and the evolutionary model of IA? In order to answer
this question, we have to focus on how the implementation of various IA programs over
time affected overall outcomes. We can see from the historical cascade research
approach that there are distinct events associated to this conceptual framework
(McKenny, 1997).
1. Crisis
2. Search for a technical solution
3. Initial technical solution found
4. Adjustments throughout the organization
5. Assets formed, which resolves crisis
6. A dominant design
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Every war started with a specific communication technology crisis. Such crisis stemmed
from initial inadequacies identified during WWI. The ill-preparedness of the U.S.
Military during WWII, Korea, and Vietnam stemmed form end of conflict cutbacks and
the reallocation of funds to other more pertinent problems of the time.
Every crisis led to military leaders formulating ideals and innovations that
developed into technical solutions. We can also see that policy drives the successful
implementation of enhancements to security programs during warfare. Over the span of
each specific conflict, adjustments were made to the initial technical solution to account
for changes in plans and policies. A dominant design was produced once changes were
incorporated and monies allocated for procurement of additional enhancements.
We can see from the evolutionary model presented earlier that advancements in
technology have always driven the dominant design of any specific period. However, a
specific dominant design may have been older technologies from previous conflicts
utilized for the technical solution to newer crisis. For example, communications
equipment used for the protection of information and information systems during WWII
were also used during the early stages of the Korean War.
The exponential growth of security incidents fueled by technological changes will
also demonstrate the future of IA related technologies, policies, and practices. Change in
the future will happen much more quickly than in the past. The dominant design focus
must shift from a reactive nature and focus on proactive leadership. Such leadership is
beginning to take shape and several established programs demonstrate the emphasis on
the future of the IA realm. Many programs center on training and certification,
educations programs, and awareness functions. One example is the NSA’s Information
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Assurance Scholarship Program, which sponsors individuals to attend colleges and
universities to study the full spectrum of IA. This program takes a proactive approach by
training individuals in IA over the entire spectrum of their adult educational experience.
This approach coupled with streamlined initiatives will dictate the overall effectiveness
of future IA related issues.

Limitations
Since this research is concerned with a period spanning considerable frame of
time, it is important to understand that the researcher was not present during the events
presented. According to Bannister (2002), historical researchers do not have to be
present when the events occurred, however, they must reconstruct and interpret events
from a variety of sources and conceptualize the findings into a logical format for further
interpretation.
This research also produces researcher bias. The information presented is the sole
interpretation of the author who incorporated various historical methodologies, including
inductive reasoning techniques, in order to produce snapshot of significant events of the
past. Even though there is bias, the picture is complete as interpreted by the author.
Thus, the final product provides a snapshot that deals primarily with the protection of
information and systems during American warfare and how these concepts evolved into
current IA structures.
Other examples of information and systems protection can be included as possible
entities within the evolutionary model. However, due to time constraints of this thesis
effort, the list provides a comprehensive view given the above control measures and a
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focus on major concepts and practices aligned with the baseline categories and the IA
model.

Suggestions for Future Research
This research effort focused on the warfare timeframe from WWI to Vietnam.
Future research could expand the current information and focus on warfare after Vietnam
through to the present Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq. Although IA programs
throughout the military have been steadily evolving since the adoption of various IA
strategies, there are significant events and occurrences continue to shape IA as we know
it. It would be beneficial to explore these later events to discover what specific changes
have occurred. Additionally, such events will provide insight into what is in the future of
IA programs across various strategic military spectrums.
Further research could also focus on a closer analysis of the various government
policies implemented over the period covered by the evolutionary process. As these
policies often involved technological advancements and practices, rapidly changing
environments were seen as threats to smooth operational procedures and troop welfare.
The implementation of various government policies also paved the way for the
development of concepts and the overall applicability of the baseline categories and the
Model dimensions. These policies stemmed from reactionary processes that favor an
“after the fact” approach. It would be interesting to discover what pertinent details of
policy creation will ensure that such occurrences and reactionary concepts do not occur in
the future.
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Conclusions
It is clear that significant events of past military warfare have shaped the current
structure of military and civilian IA programs. Even though specific terms and views
have changed or been re-designated, core concepts directly related to the NSA IAM
baseline categories and the IA model were prevalent throughout the period covered.
These concepts are still relevant and active in the current structure of IA. Additionally,
these concepts and the entire evolutionary model demonstrate that the concept currently
known as IA did in fact evolve from earlier forms of information and information
systems security concepts during warfare. We can learn from these early examples and
ultimately shape the future of IA by developing new concepts from those of the past.

70

Bibliography
Bannister, Frank. “The Dimension of Time: Historigraphy in Information Systems
Research.” Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods. Volume 1 Issue 1.
2002.
Barker, Wayne, G. The History of Codes and Ciphers in the United States During World
War I. CA: Aegean Park Press, 1979.
Beauregard, Joseph, E., Modeling Information Assurance. MS thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS.
School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright Patterson
AFB, OH, March 2001.
Boone, J.V. and R.R. Peterson. National Security Agency (NSA). The Start of the
Digital Revolution: SIGSALY Secure Digital Voice Communications in World
War II. Excerpt from published report. Fort Meade, MD: NSA, Oct. 13, 2000.
Borg, Walter, R., Gall, M., Gall, J. Educational Research: An Introduction. Pearson,
Allyn & Bacon, 2002.
CERT/Coordination Center (CERT/CC). Security of the Internet. Pittsburgh: Carnegie
Mellon Software Engineering Institute, 27 November 2000. n. pag. Excerpt from
published report, http://www.cert.org/encyc_article/tocencyc.html.
Churchhouse, Robert. Codes and Ciphers: Julius Caesar, the Egnima, and the Internet.
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
DeGallaix, Henry M. Destruction of the Brussels Radio Station. Radio Amateur
News, November 1919.
Denning, Dorothy, E., Information Warfare and Security. NY: ACM Press Books, 1999.
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations. Washington: Pentagon, 9 October 1998.
Department of Defense. Joint Vision 2020. Washington DC: GPO, June 2000.
Diffie, Whitfield. Information Security: Where We Stand; Where We are Headed.
Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and
Development. Excerpt from unpublished report to the Select Committee on
Homland Security, U.S. House of Representatives. July 15, 2003.
Finnegan, John, P. and Danysh, Romana. Military Intelligence. Washington DC: Center
for Military History, U.S. Army. 1998.

71

Fishel, Edwin, C. The Secret War for the Union. NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1996.
Gumahad, A. T., II. “The profession of arms in the Information Age.” Joint Force
Quarterly: 14-20 (Spring 1997)
Hatch, David, A. and Benson, Robert, L. National Security Agency (NSA), The Korean
War: The SIGINT Background. Excerpt from published report. Fort Meade,
MD: NSA, June 28, 2000.
Hurd, Bryan, E. “The Digital Economy and the Evolution of Information Assurance.”
Proceedings of the IEEE: 252-257. June 2001.
Johnson, Thomas, R., National Security Agency (NSA), Essay on the Korean War.
Excerpt from published report. Fort Meade, MD: NSA, September 28, 2000.
Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. NY: Macmillan, 1967.
Kippenhahn, Rudolf. Code Breaking, A History and Exploration. NY: Overlook, 1999.
Knode, Monti, L. Perceptions vs Reality: A Longitudinal Experiment in Influenced
Judgment Performance. MS Thesis, AFIT/GIR/ENV/03-09. School of
Ingineering, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright Patterson AFB, OH,
March 2003.
Kuhn, M.G. and Ross J. Anderson. “Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmissions
Using Electromagnetic Emanations.” Information Hiding: 1988.
Lee, J., Burke, C., and D. Anderson. The US Bombes, NCR, Joseph Desch, and 600
Waves: The First Reunion of the US Naval Computing Machine Laboratory.
IEEE, Annals of the History of computing: July-September 2000.
Leedy, Paul, D. and Ormrod, Jeanne. Research Planning and Design. NY: Prentice
Hall, 2000
Longstaff, T.A., Ellis, J.T., Herman, S. V., Lipson, H. F., McMillan, R. D., Pensante, L.
H., and D. Simmel. Security of the Internet. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon
University, Software Engineering Institite, 1997. n. pag. Excerpt from published
article, http://www.cert.org/encyc_article/tocencyc.html
Mason, R. O. and J.L. McKenney. “Developing an Historical Tradition in MIS
Research.” MIS Quarterly: Sept. 1997.
Mason, R. O., McKenney, J.L., and D.G. Copeland. “An Historical Method for MIS
Research: Steps and Assumptions.” MIS Quarterly: Sept. 1997.

72

McKnight, Walter, L. “What is Information Assurance?” CrossTalk: July 2002.
http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2002/07/index.html.
Myer, Charles, R. LTGen, USA. Vietnam Studies: Division Level Communications,
1962-1973. Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: 1982.
Montgomery, Bernard L. History of Warfare. Ohio: World Publishing, 1968.
Newton, David, E. Encyclopedia of Cryptology. California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1998.
Rienzi, T. M., LTGen, USA. Vietnam Studies: Communications Electronics, 19621970. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.: 1972.
Smith, Michael. The Emperor’s Codes: The Breaking of Japan’s Secret Ciphers. NY:
Arcade, 2000.
Stanford, M. The Nature of Historical Knowledge. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
Stoll, Clifford. The Cuckoo’s Egg. NY: Doubleday, 1989.
Swanson, M. and B. Guttman. Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing
Information Technology Systems. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), Technology Admin, U.S. Dept. of Commerce: September
1996.
United State Marine Corps Institute. Communications Security. Washington, DC:
Marine Barracks, 26 Jan 1998.
Weadon, Patrick, D. National Security Agency (NSA), The KoreanWar: SIGINT and
COMSEC Help Save the Day at Pusan. Excerpt from published report. Fort
Meade, MD: NSA, September 18, 2000.
Weadon, Patrick, D. National Security Agency (NSA). The SIGSALY Story. Excerpt
from published report. Fort Meade, MD: NSA, Oct. 13, 2000.
Westover, John, G. Combat Support in Korea. Washington, DC: U.S Army, 1987.
Wrixon, Fred, B. Codes and Ciphers & Other Cryptic & Clandestine Communication.
NY: Black Dog & Leventhal, 1998.
Zakon, Robert H. “Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v5.2.” 19 November 2000. Excerpt from
published article, http//info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/internet/History/Hit.html.

73

Vita
Gunnery Sergeant Kelvin Bernard Scott enlisted in the Marine Corps and attended
Recruit Training at Parris Island, South Carolina in June 1988. He holds a BS from the
University of Maryland and a MS from Troy State University.
He attended the Basic Supply Course at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany
Georgia. In December 1988, he transferred to MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. In support
of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm during the Persian Gulf War, Corporal Scott
embarked aboard the USS Tripoli and the USS Tarawa for duty. In February 1992, he
reported to Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Training Battalion in Chesapeake,
Virginia and was later assigned to MCSF Company, London, England. During his tour in
London, he served as Sergeant of the Guard, and Color Sergeant. Additionally, he was
voted as Marine of the Year and Meritoriously Promoted to Sergeant. In July 1995, he
was assigned to the Third Force Service Support Group, Okinawa, Japan. During hs tour
on Okinawa, he served a variety of positions within supply and management field. In
September 1999, Staff Sergeant Scott reported to the Marine Security Guard School at
Quantico, Virginia and was later assigned as the Detachment Commander of Marine
Security Guard Detachments, Dakar, Senegal and Bangkok, Thailand.
In August 2002, Gunnery Sergeant Scott entered the Graduate School of
Engineering and Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Upon graduation,
he will be assigned as the Information Assurance Manager, Headquarters III Marine
Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan. He is married and they have two children.

74

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188),
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty
for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

03-12-2004

Master’s Thesis

Jun 2003 – Mar 2004

4.

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED THE EVOLUTION OF

5b. GRANT NUMBER

INFORMATION ASSURANCE FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM TO THE PRESENT

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
If funded, enter ENR #
5e. TASK NUMBER

AUTHOR(S)

Scott, Kelvin, B., Gunnery Sergeant, USMC

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)
Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 P Street, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-7765
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
HQMC, C4
Attn: Master Sergeant Dulany
2 Navy Annex
Washington, DC 20380-1775
Phone: 703-693-3490
Email: dulanykm@hqmc.usmc.mil

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

AFIT/GIR/ENV/04M-22
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S
ACRONYM(S)
HQMC C4
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S
REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
This study is an exploratory historical analysis of the factors that have influenced the evolution of military Information Assurance (IA) programs from World
War I to the present. Although the term IA has recently been widely used throughout the Information Resource Management field (IRM), evidence indicates
that information and information systems protection mechanisms were used during every U.S. Military conflict. This research proposes to increase the body
of knowledge within the information systems management field by exploring the areas related to Information Assurance (IA) and the ultimate goal of U. S.
Defensive Information Warfare.
I found that significant events related to the protection of information and information systems security throughout each U.S. Military conflict led to the
implementation of IA concepts. The evaluation of these events provides key information that reveals a common approach to IA throughout history and
supports the identification of key concepts that have influenced this evolutionary process and shaped the role of IA in current military operations, with
indicators of how it may be used in the future.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Information Assurance, History, Evolution, INFOSEC, COMSEC, Communications, WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam and Internet History
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF:

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

REPORT

ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

UU

U

U

U

18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
85

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
Alan R. Heminger, PhD, AFIT/ENV
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(937) 785-3636 Ext. 4797 alan.heminger@afit.edu

75

